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Cash holding and control-oriented nance
Abstract
We critically reassess the notion that high liquid asset holding by
rms faced with weak investor protection is evidence of managerial
rent extraction. We argue that relatively high cash holdings may be
the by-product of control-oriented nance which results in a nan-
cial structure characterized by levered rms with highly concentrated
share ownership. We explore this using a data on Belgian listed rms
between 1991 to 2006. We show that ownership concentration and
family ownership are very common in this sample and that signicant
share ownership by top managers is uncommon. We nd a strong
positive association between ownership concentration and cash hold-
ing. We nd no association between managerial shareholding and cash
holding. We show that rm market valuation is positively aected by
the amount of cash held by rms. These results are consistent with
hypothesis that rms' owners are pursuing a rational strategy to mit-
igate agency costs in the face of weak investor protections.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the eect of ownership structure on cash holdings
and how the market values the cash held by rms.1 One prominent view
regarding the amounts of cash held by rms, in the tradition of Berle &
Means (1932), focuses on the possible conict of interests between managers
and shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are particularly
severe in rms with substantial large free cash ows. Similarly, if as argued
by Myers & Rajan (1998) liquid assets are relatively easy to transform into
private benets for managers, then we would expect that when governance
structures are weak managers will lead the rm to hold relatively high levels
of liquid assets.
A number of international cross-country studies have been interpreted as
lending support for the view that relatively high cash holdings are a symptom
of managerial rent extraction. For instance, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes
(2003) nd that cash holding tends to be high in countries with relatively
weak investor protection. Kusnadi & Wei (2011) argue that legal protection
of investors results in lower levels of cash held by rms. Pinkowitz, Stulz &
Williamson (2006) nd that cash reserves are valued less in countries with
weak investor protection since controlling insiders in these countries have
greater ability to extract private benets from cash holdings. Kalcheva &
Lins (2007) make a direct link between cash holdings and managerial own-
ership. First, they nd some evidence of a positive association between the
fraction of shares held by management and cash holdings. Second, they show
that rm values are lower when controlling managers hold more cash and
1We use the terms cash and liquid assets throughout the paper indierently.
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external country-level shareholder protection is weak. They interpret their
results as evidence of managerial agency problems when external shareholder
protections are poor.
In this paper we critically reassess these ndings and oer an alternative
explanation of the motives of cash holdings by studying Belgian listed rms.
The Belgian case is interesting because by common metrics the Belgian cor-
porate system is characterized by poor investor protection (e.g., La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1998). At the same time Belgium has
inherited a control-oriented nancial system. This features high levels of
ownership concentration and a continuing prominence of family rms, even
several generations after their foundation.2 This is facilitated in part by a
well-developed system of voting alliances which allows a greater voting power
and in part by control devices that makes it harder for hostile takeovers to
take place (Becht & Roell 1999). In this context, the role of the stock mar-
ket to nance new investments is not as prominent as in market-oriented
economies which enjoy liquid capital markets ( n.d.). Instead, growth op-
portunities requiring external nance are pursued principally through debt
nance. This use of leverage by owners with long investment horizons can
create a strong precautionary motive for cash holding. This tendency may
be reinforced by shareholder risk aversion if control is maintained only at
the cost of under-diversication. Goergen & Renneboog (2001) argue that
in Belgium often a large proportion of the controlling shareholders wealth is
invested in the rm with a long term commitment. As a consequence rela-
tively high cash holding may be a constrained optimal policy for such owners
2For some rms it is the fourth generation who is in charge.
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whose long-term returns are threatened by the loss of control through dis-
tressed issuance of outside equity or bankruptcy.
In this study we carefully construct a data set of Belgian listed rms from
1991 to 2006 which allows us to determine the degree to which control rights
are concentrated in blocks of shares and also whether a controlling ownership
block has family links to the rm's founder. We nd evidence to support the
hypothesis that relatively high levels of cash holding are a reection of a
rational strategy by owners who seek value through long-term control. First,
we show that shareholding is very concentrated, but managerial sharehold-
ing tends to be very small compared to the controlling shareholders. In more
than 85% of the cases observed, no manager reports share ownership in the
rm.3 In contrast, on average the controlling shareholder block holds 54% of
shares. Second, shareholders concentrate control rights by joining in voting
alliances.4 Our data indicated that in almost one third of our observations
there is a voting alliance of shareholders who commit to act in unison. Con-
trolling shareholders in voting alliances hold on average 55% of the shares
against 53% for large controlling shareholders who are not part of any voting
alliance. Third, our data show that debt nancing is very high in Belgian
listed rms. The median of the ratio of debt to assets is 36%, which is higher
than for any country reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their inter-
national comparison of leverage in listed rms. Fourth, liquid asset holding
3The Belgian disclosure law of 1989 requires shareholders to notify the Banking Com-
mission when their shareholding reaches 5%. But many rms have statutes that require
notication of any holding that reaches a threshold of 3%.
4To the best of our knowledge no cross-country study on ownership and cash holdings
has considered voting alliances. This is probably due to the fact that data available from
the usual providers like Bureau Van Dijk report shareholders individually without making
any link between them through the voting blocks alliances.
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is positively associated with ownership concentration. On the other hand,
there is no signicant eect of managerial ownership on the amount of cash
held by rms. A robustness test indicates that under-diversied controlling
shareholders are associated with more cash holdings. Fifth, we nd that
the amount of cash held by rms is positively associated with rm's market
value.
Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of cash hold-
ings and the role of corporate governance in rms' cash holdings (see for
instance, Nikolov & Whited 2014, Liu, Mauer & Zhang 2014, Iskander-Datta
& Jia 2012, Kusnadi & Wei 2011, Harford, Mansi & Maxwell 2008, Kalcheva
& Lins 2007, Pinkowitz et al. 2006, Ozkan & Ozkan 2004, Dittmar et al. 2003,
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson 1999). It brings a dierent perspective
than other studies which suppose that cash holdings reect choices taken
by relatively powerful managers.5 In our sample, we nd share ownership
achieves a degree of concentration where it is likely that managers are ef-
fectively monitored. In addition, managerial shareholding is quasi-inexistent
and if managers are shareholders typically they are part of voting coalitions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 is devoted to our
estimation methodology. In Section 5 we present our main results. Section
6 explores extensions and robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
5It diers for instance from Kalcheva & Lins (2007) who also have Belgium in their
cross-country study, but who focus on the eect of managerial ownership on cash holdings.
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2 Hypotheses
In this section, we develop more explicitly our argument of why, in a control-
oriented nancial system, rms facing agency problems may establish tight
controls over management through concentrated ownership and why this cre-
ates a strong precautionary motive for holding greater amounts of cash than
would be the case in the absence of agency problems. This is the consequence
of inside shareholders assigning a high control premium to equity implying
that issuing outside equity is particularly costly. Then under an optimal div-
idend and cash retention policy in the face of costly outside equity issuance
and costly bankruptcy, the rm will seek to maintain a relatively large cash
buer. This has been demonstrated by Anderson and Carverhill (2012) using
an innite horizon model. A value-maximizing rm follows an optimal dy-
namic dividend policy that aims at holding a cash buer at a state dependent
target level. They retain earnings when cash holdings fall short the target,
and they pay out any excess of earnings beyond what is needed to maintain
cash at the targeted amount. When earnings fall short of contracted interest
payments they nance debt service following a pecking order rule: rst draw
down cash, second issue more debt if the rm is below debt capacity and
third issue outside equity. All else equal the targeted amount of cash will be
higher, the higher is the cost of external nance.6.
In applying this analysis to the case of control-oriented nance as in
Belgium, we note that the costs of share issuance will be relatively high in
rms whose incumbent shareholders place a high value on control. This is
6For a discussion of other theoretical frameworks that give rise to a precautionary
motive for cash see Kimball (1992)
5
because issuing shares to service debt when there is a shortfall of cash ows
will imply a dissipation of control rights. Therefore, such rms target higher
levels of cash. This amount of cash holding is higher than would be optimal
in the absence of agency problems. However, it is second-best optimal. That
is, in the face of agency problems it gives the owner a higher value than if he
held a lower amount of cash.
Note that this precautionary motive for holding cash holds for value
maximizing shareholders. The precautionary motive would be reinforced if
shareholders were risk averse. This well may be the case when concentrated
ownership is achieved at the cost of under-diversication of the controlling
shareholders' wealth. Concentrated ownership does not necessarily imply
risk aversion. For example, a large, diversied private equity fund may own
a controlling block of shares. However this has not been a common mode
of ownership in Belgium. In part this is for historical reasons. Many of the
largest Belgian rms trace their origins to the industrial development in Bel-
gium during the late 19th Century and in many cases they are still family
rms in the sense that the owners have links to the founding owner. Further-
more, this structure has been protected against change by various take-over
protections that have been in place from time to time.7 And this has not
7For instance, this applies in the case of a large controlling shareholder who owns a
mono-holding company with the only purpose of controlling the listed rm. A concrete
example is the rm Solvay which is held by the founding families Solvay and Janssen, and
the mono-holding Solvac. Solvac is listed but it has registered shares that can only be
held by private investors. Solvac signed an agreement with Sona S.A., Deutsche Bank
AG, and Generale de Banque S.A. to impede any hostile takeover bids for Solvay. Sona
S.A. on the other hand is controlled by the families Boel, Solvay, and Janssen (Becht &
Mayer 2001). The three families are linked by marriages (Verduyn 2013). Another example
is the use of foundations incorporated in The Netherlands. These are known in Dutch as
the Stichting AdministratieKantoor (see e.g., The Wall Street Journal Cohen 2006, Raice
& Patrick 2015).
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been dissipated over the years through inheritance by successive generations
of heirs because there has been an eective coordinating mechanism through
voting alliances which are both explicit and legal.
Now what are the empirical implications of this analysis that we can test
using data on Belgian rms?
Hypothesis 1. We should expect to nd a positive association between share
concentration and cash holdings.
Firms facing relatively high agency costs tend to acquire more control
rights in order to better monitor management. They would assign a higher
control premium to the shares implying a higher cost of external nance and
higher targeted and realized cash holdings.
In control-oriented corporate systems with limited access to external -
nancing cash holdings provide a cushion to face key nancing decisions as
well as a means to be able to face possible hostile takeovers. The importance
of control is discussed in Holmen, Knopf & Peterson (2007) for Swedish rms.
Most notably, they nd that less diversied controlling institutional share-
holders are signicantly less likely to have their rms taken over, and they
show that these shareholders are primarily concerned with control and not
diversication. Thus the precautionary motive for shareholders is strongly
related to the eventuality of the loss of control over the rm. In Belgium, it
is not uncommon that large controlling shareholders reach the point to delist
their rms from the stock market with no other obvious reason than the fear
of losing the control. This was the case, for instance, with the rm BMT
where the controlling family Seynaeve decided to delist it in 2004.8 The beer
8The family Seynaeve controlled BMT with almost 40% of shares via her privately
7
company Duvel Moortgat had the same fate, its controlling family decided to
delist it and pay 120 billion Euros in cash for it (Vandendooren 2012).9 In ef-
fect, the insiders value their shares more highly than do the outside investors
without the same interest in control.
Hypothesis 2. We should expect to nd zero association between managerial
shareholdings and cash holdings.
If ownership concentration eectively establishes shareholder control over
management, it can prevent asset substitution of liquid assets and keep the
choice of cash holding under shareholder control. The owners of the rm
may reward managers with shares, e.g., to incentivise higher eort. However
doing so would not aect the choice of liquid asset holdings.
Hypothesis 3. We should expect to nd a positive association between cash
holding and rm value in family rms.
A successful entrepreneurial rm may generate more growth opportuni-
ties than it can nance through retentions or debt. Thus at some point it
may be faced with the choice of either grow with outside equity and eventu-
ally face loss of control or grow more slowly but retain control. Often these
owned company and which is incorporated in the Netherlands. In 2003 the family formed
a voting block with the other shareholders in the rm making the share ownership of this
voting coalition to reach almost 51%.
9The family Moortgat held the company via its foundation which is incorporated in the
Netherlands. This foundation is what is known in Dutch as \Stichting AdministratorKan-
toor". These structures made the news, for instance in The Wall Street Journal, because
of their role as an eective anti-takeover defense (see, for instance Cohen 2006, Raice &
Patrick 2015). In 2006 the family owned 64.13% of shares via her foundation, one cousin
and board member owned 10.13%, other family members held 0.76%, and the company
itself had an auto-control of 0.65%. All these shareholders were in the same voting block
making the percentage of share ownership, altogether, almost 76%.
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problems become particularly telling as the rm matures and the question
of succession arises. Franks, Mayer, Volpin & Wagner (2012) provide evi-
dence suggesting that within-family succession of CEO's is prevalent among
continental European family-rms as compared to the UK where non-family
succession is more frequent. Sraer & Thesmar (2007) document the fact
that in France family-rms tend to be smaller than non-family-rms after
controlling for age of rm and other factors. Also using French data, Bach
(2009) links the growth of rms to succession choices and nds that rms
favoring within-family succession tend to grow more slowly than do rms
favoring non-family succession. Consequently, many established family rms
may be operating at close to their debt capacity. If that is the case, the anal-
ysis of Anderson and Carverhill shows that good performance and therefore
increases in rm value are associated with increases in cash holdings.
3 Data
3.1 Governance data
We carefully construct a cleaned ownership data set which we collect for our
sample period from 1991 to 2006 from the printed annual reports of listed
rms. We supplement this with notications from the Documentation and
Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock Exchange collected in confor-
mity with the 1989 law on ownership disclosure. We also use the annual
publication from ING bank (Banque Bruxelles Lambert, previously) on the
ownership positions of Belgian listed rms, when available. The resulting
database better suits our research than do the already existing ones, namely,
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BDPart, available in the Documentation and Statistics Department of Brus-
sels Stock Exchange, and the Financial Reports of Belgian rms from the
National Bank of Belgium (NBB, henceforth). Specically in the former,
every time there is a change in the ownership composition, the previous data
is overwritten, so it has no historical memory. In the latter, only Belgian
shareholders are reported with no indication given about foreign sharehold-
ers. Furthermore, a comparison of the printed annual reports and the NBB
data revealed frequent discrepancies in ownership information. It is worth
noting that starting from 1997 ownership positions of listed rms are re-
ported in the database \Belrst" from Bureau Van Dijk. However, we found
several mistakes in the data reported by this source. This database cannot
be used as it is and needs an almost manual clean up.
The year 1991 is our starting period because from that date all rms
were required to report ownership information including all holdings greater
than 5% (or 3% if the rm writes this into its statutes).10 Under this law all
reporting shareholders are also required to report whether or not they par-
ticipate in a shareholder voting alliance and to identify the make-up of that
alliance. Shares may be held by individuals or by rms. In the latter case,
the reporting rm is required to indicate whether they belong to a business
group, which under Belgian law is a collection of rms that is consolidated
for the purposes of taxation. Our data ends in 2006 because after this year
there were major changes in the disclosure law which might interfere with
the eects we want to study in the current paper.
10The Belgian disclosure law was adopted in 1989, but for the years 1989 and 1990,
some of the rms enjoyed a \grace period", where the shareholders of these rms were not
obliged to notify the Banking Commission, but by the end of 1991 ownership disclosure
was mandatory for all rms.
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3.1.1 Controlling shareholder
Based on the reports of the dierent share-ownership and to identify the
largest controlling shareholder we aggregate shareholding within the same
voting alliance or within the same business group. Then we calculate the size
and type of the largest block of shares for each rm in each year. There are
three possible types of largest controlling shareholders: (1) business groups
which are based on shareholdings only of rms within the same business
group, (2) voting alliances which are based on shareholdings of rms, busi-
ness groups and individuals who belong to the same voting alliance, and (3)
independent stakes which could be rms or individuals who belong neither
to business groups or voting alliances.
From Table 1 we see that the level of ownership concentration in Belgian
listed rms is very high. On average the largest shareholders hold 54% of
equities. In three quarters of the observations the level of concentration is
40% or more.
3.1.2 Shareholders diversication: Shareholdings of shareholders
As discussed above, the precautionary incentive to hold cash in the rm may
be reinforced by shareholder risk aversion if the controlling shareholder's
wealth is highly concentrated in the rm. In order to provide evidence of
under-diversication of largest shareholders in Belgian listed rms we fol-
low Faccio & Lang (2002) in using information provided in regulatory lings
to determine the number of declared holdings of the controlling block hold-
ers. In our implementation of this, in addition to the above data sources,
we use various other sources and undertake a detailed examination of the
11
composition of the contolling shareholders' portfolios.11 With the informa-
tion gathered we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a share-
holder is under diversied or not. Our classication indicates that out of
1648 rm/year observations 1218 are rms where the controlling shareholder
appears to have one share ownership which is the listed rm. On the other
hand, 430 rm/year observations are diversied controlling shareholders who
have more than one stock in their portfolios. Further explanation on data
collection and variable construction are in Appendix A. However, we should
point out that a limitation of any measurement of under-diversication based
on declared ownership is that the controlling block may itself be a legal en-
tity which itself is held by a number of persons and that we are not able to
directly observe these owners' personal portfolios. 12
3.1.3 Family rms
Our starting point for identifying family-rms are the shareholder reports in
accordance with the law of 1989 on ownership disclosure. In the declaration of
control to the Banking Commission it is said clearly that the shareholder is a
family group. We supplement this with information on ultimate ownership of
stakes held by rms to determine cases of control by a family-rm indirectly
11We use various data sources including the depository of the annual accounts of Belgian
rms at the National Bank of Belgium database known as the \Centrale des Bilans",
Bureau Van Dijk databases: Belrst and Amadeus, data on families wealth from Verduyn
(2013) as well several press articles from the online archives of the Belgian nancial press
like Trends-Tendances.
12Ideally, we would like to observe the composition of the portfolios of the members in
the controlling shareholder blocks, along the lines of the study by Mueller (2008). Such
data are rarely obtainable generally and are not available in the case of Belgian rms.
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through a pyramid.13 In this latter case we determine whether there is a
known link to the family of the founding owner(s). This is close to Sraer &
Thesmar (2007) who dene a family-rm as one where the founder or the
heir is in control. This procedures diers from that of Faccio & Lang (2002)
who assume that an ownership block held by an unlisted company represents
de facto a family.14
3.1.4 Managerial ownership
We compute managerial share holding as the total reported shares owned by
the member of the board of directors including the chairman, the managing
director and the administrative director. In some cases it is observed that
all members of the board are associated with a voting alliance. In all such
cases all reporting managers are members of the same voting alliance. For
these cases managerial share holding is the total shares in that alliance.
Remarkably, in 1409 cases (86% of all observations) there is no report-
ing manager (see Table 2, Panels A and B). Thus the level of managerial
shareholding is low as compared to the high degree of reported ownership
concentration. It turns out that in the Belgian context large managerial
share holdings are almost always associated with family-rms. The median
share ownership of a reporting manager in family-rms is of 64%, while in
non-family-rms the median of share ownership of a reporting manager is of
13The disclosure law applies directly to the owners of the voting rights, as well as to those
investors who control voting rights indirectly via a pyramidal structure of intermediate
companies. Hence, when it is a family who is on the top of the pyramid this is indicated
in the declaration of control.
14More details on family-rm data and comparison with Faccio & Lang (2002) procedure
of classifying rms are in the Appendix.
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41% (Table 2, Panel A).
3.2 Firm level accounting data
Our sample consists of all active Belgian listed rms except those in the
banking, insurance and real estate sectors. During the sample period there
were some listed rms in liquidation which we exclude. This selection process
leaves us with a sample of 1648 annual observations of 196 rms for the
period 1991 to 2006. Accounting variables, from 1991 to 1996, are from
the year-end annual accounts of rms available from the database called
\Centrale des Bilans" edited by the NBB. Then from 1997 to 2006 we use
the database called \Belrst" available from Bureau Van Dijk. From these
sources we construct our dependent variable cash holdings and the rest of
our explanatory variables: total debt, investment in nancial xed assets,
R&D expenditures, working capital, cash ow, capital expenditures, rms'
size which we construct by using total assets, and rms' age. To construct
our proxy for the market valuation of the rm we use market-to-book value.
We obtain year-end market value from the Brussels Stock Exchange. We
also use daily stock prices data from Datastream to compte the standard
deviation of stock returns as a measure of rm's risk.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. One thing to note
is the the median leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets) in our sample
is 36%. This is higher than the median leverage for any country reported
in Table 2 of Rajan' and Zingales' international comparison of leverage in
listed rms (Rajan & Zingales 1995). It is consistent with our argument that
Belgian rms have tended to grow using debt rather than outside equity.
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4 Estimation methodology
We use a panel data model to explore the relation between dierent measures
of ownership and cash holdings by rms. We report the results of the OLS,
xed eects, and random eects models. In most of our specications, the
Hausman tests favor the xed eects model over the random eects one. Us-
ing rm xed eects helps controlling for the possible eect of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity at rm-level.
Our main specication testing the eect of large controlling shareholders
on cash holdings is the following:
Cashit =0 + 1Largest Shareholderit + 2Ageit + 3Sizeit + 4Total debtit
+5Financial xed assetsit + 6Capital expendituresit + 7Working capitalit
+8Cash owit + 9R&Dit + i + "it;
(1)
where, for rm i and year t Cashit stands for cash in hand and at bank,
and marketable securities scaled by total assets, Largest Shareholderit is the
percentage of the shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the rm either
she/he is an individual or a voting block, Ageit is rm's age expressed in log,
Sizeit is measured by the log of total assets, Total debtit is the sum of short-
term and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Financial xed assetsit is the
ratio of shareholdings of the rm in tied rms and rms with which there
exists a participation link scaled by total assets15, Capital expendituresit are
15The rms tied to another rm are: the rms that control it, the rms that it controls,
the rms with which it forms a consortium, the other rms that, to the knowledge of the
15
new acquisitions of tangible assets scaled by total assets, Working capitalit
is computed net of cash and is scaled by total assets, Cash owit is earnings
before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, R&Dit are expenses in R&D
scaled by total assets, i is a rm eect (which is either xed, random, or
omitted depending upon whether the estimation method is FE, RE or OLS),
and "it is a residual.
In Equation 1 we make no distinction between large controlling sharehold-
ers. They could be one entity, for instance one rm or one person, as well as
a voting block which is a collection of shareholders. With this equation we
test our Hypothesis 1. To explore more in depth the type of shareholders,
for instance whether being in voting block has an impact on cash holdings,
we augment the above equation with a dummy variable which takes on the
value of one if the largest shareholder is a collection of several shareholders
organized in a voting coalition and zero otherwise. We also add an interacted
term between largest shareholder variable and voting block dummy.
We consider a variation on Equation 1 by including a dummy variables
for managerial ownership. This allows us to test Hypothesis 2. In a similar
manner we also explore the eect of the presence of large shareholders, voting
blocks, or families.
To study the relationship between cash holding and rm value we use the
board, are controlled by one of the rms mentioned above. The rms with which there
exists a participation link are the rms, other than tied rms, in which the rm or its
subsidiary holds a direct or indirect participation.
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following basic specication.
Tobin's Qit =0 + 1Cashit + 2Largest Shareholderit + 3Ageit + 4Sizeit
+5Total debtit + 6Financial xed assetsit + 7Capital expendituresit
+8R&Dit + i + "it;
(2)
where, for rm i and year t Tobin's Qit is computed as market-to-book value
and is our proxy for market rm's value, Cashit stands for cash in hand and at
bank, and marketable securities scaled by total assets, Largest Shareholderit
is the percentage of the direct shareholdings of the largest shareholder in
the rm either she/he is an individual or a voting block, Ageit is rm's age
expressed in log, Sizeit is measured by the log of total assets, Total debtit is the
sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Financial xed assetsit
is the ratio of shareholdings of the rm in tied rms and rms with which
there exists a participation link scaled by total assets, Capital expendituresit
are new acquisitions of tangible assets scaled by total assets, R&Dit are ex-
penses in R&D, scaled by total assets, i is a rm xed eect, and "it is a
residual. In a particular version of this model we explore whether the relation
between rm value and cash holding diers for family rms as compared to
non-family rms. To do so we augment the specication using a dummy vari-
able Family. Our hypothesis 3 is tested as the prediction of a positive partial
correlation between rm value and the interaction of Cash and Family. We
also estimate other specications where we include dierent interacted terms
between Cash, Largest Shareholder, Voting blocks, and Manager.
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5 Results
5.1 Preliminary analysis
Table 2 summarizes mean and median of liquid assets and share concentration
for our sample in three two-way classications. In Panel A we classify rms as
family-rms versus non-family ones and as rms with share-owning managers
versus without share-owning managers. In Panel B the classication is based
on rms with voting blocks versus rms without voting blocks and on with
share-owning managers versus without share-owning managers. In Panel C,
we group based on family ownership status and presence or not of voting
blocks.
The rst striking observation from Table 2 is the very high level of own-
ership concentration. In almost every category of rm (family versus non-
family, with voting block versus without voting block) the mean controlling
shareholding exceeds 50% of the shares. The exception is when there is a
reporting manager, in which case the controlling shareholder typically holds
about 47% of the share, still a very concentrated holding. Second, we observe
that signicant managerial share ownership is the exception rather than the
rule. There are reporting managers in only 239 out of 1648 observations
overall. When we analyze the dierent types of classications in Table 2 we
notice that family-rms come rst in terms of ownership concentration when
shareholders are organized in voting blocks. Their ownership is as high as 61
percent against 51 percent in the absence of voting blocks (Panel C). Note
that family-rms represent one third of our sample.
Panels A or B show no signicant dierence in cash holdings in the pres-
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ence of a reporting manager or not. This is preliminary evidence that does
not support the view that powerful managers use their prerogatives to push
rms towards holding more liquid assets.
5.2 Cash holdings and governance
We test our dierent hypotheses using panel data models. We report our
results for OLS, xed eects and random eects models. However, we limit
our comments to the results of xed eects specications since the Hausman
tests favor them.
Table 3 reports our results for the baseline cash holding regressions. Our
rst major result is that Largest shareholder enters with a positive and sig-
nicant coecient in all the specications. This supports our Hypothesis 1
that increased shareholder control obtained through concentrated ownership
is associated with higher level of cash holding. The presence or not of voting
blocks does not alter the eect of concentration on cash holding. However,
we nd for family rms, with or without voting blocks, the eect of increased
concentration (i.e., higher share in the controlling) block has not signicant
eect on cash holding.
The rest of control variables we include in the estimations are in line with
previous literature. Total debt and Working capital are negatively related
to the cash held by rms which is consistent with the argument that they
play the role of substitutes for cash. For instance, studies like Opler et al.
(1999), Kim, Mauer & Sherman (1998), or Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) nd a
negative relationship between leverage and liquid asset holdings. Also, Opler
et al. (1999) argue that rms use factoring and securitization as a means of
19
raising liquidity. Accordingly, rms with high working capital are expected
to hold less cash. Our results also show that rms with more investment in
nancial xed assets hold less cash. This nding is consistent with Opler
et al. (1999), who use the number of reported lines of business segments
to measure whether rms have non-core assets that could be liquidated in
periods of economic distress. More generally, industrial cross-shareholding
may indicate the existence of an internal capital market that operates among
related rms. This seems to be the case with our variable Financial xed
assets which represents the amounts invested by the rms in tied rms and
rms with which there exists a participation link. Like in Opler et al. (1999),
we nd that rms with more cash ows hold more cash. This is consistent
with the view that rms with high cash ow will accumulate a larger cash
buer, in line with the results of Anderson & Carverhill (2012) for rms
approaching debt capacity. Regarding Capital expenditures, whereas rms
may hold nancial slack in anticipation of investment opportunities, they
draw down these resources at the time the investments are made. As expected
we nd a negative association between cash and new investments; however,
it is not statistically signicant. We nd no signicant eect of R&D, age or
size on cash holdings.
In Table 4, we turn our attention to managerial ownership and its ef-
fect on cash holdings. The introduction of the dummy variable Manager
has essentially no eect on the cash holding regression results. Manager is
insignicant, and this variable interacted with Largest shareholder is also
insignicant. At the same time, the variable Largest shareholder continues
to enter positively and is signicant. This supports the Hypothesis 2 and
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undermines the interpretation of cash holding in systems with weak investor
protections as a manifestation of managerial rent extraction. These remarks
hold as well when we allow for family rm eects (columns 4-6) or voting
alliance eects (columns 7-9).
Finally we turn to the relation of rm value and cash holding. Table
5 presents the results of the estimations of the eect of Cash on Tobin's
Q. In columns 1-3 we nd a signicant positive relationship of Cash and
rm value. This carries over to the xed eect results reported in column 8
where we have included family and voting alliance eects. Largest shareholder
enter positively and is signicant, and the interaction term between Family
and Cash is positive and highly signicant. The eects of the other control
variables are in line with previous literature studying dierent eects on rm
value. We conclude that our results support our Hypothesis 3.
6 Extensions
6.1 Shareholders diversication and cash holdings and
rm risk taking
In this section we consider a variety of extensions of our basic cash holding
regressions. First, we explore whether controlling shareholder risk aversion
might account for our ndings. As already argued above a value maximiz-
ing controlling shareholder will have a precautionary motive for holding cash
when outside equity nance is seen as very costly. This would be reinforced if
controlling shareholders are risk averse and have established their controlling
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block only at the cost of having wealth heavily concentrated in the rm's
shares. In principle, the eect of risk aversion could be relatively more im-
portant quantitatively than the eect of control premia assigned to outside
equity.
To explore this idea we have developed an approach along the lines of Fac-
cio, Marchica & Mura (2011) who develop a meaure of under-diversication
based on numbers of holdings that surpass a declaration threshold. Speci-
cally as discussed in Section 3.1.2 we used available information on ownership
declarations to construct an indicator variable for rms whose controlling
block holder is under-diversied. At the same time we also introduce a con-
trol variable for level of rm risk-taking. Specically we use the estimated
volatility of the rm's stock returns. As stock returns are not available for
all rms in our data set, we are able to construct this variable only for a
sub-sample.
The results are presented in Table 6. In columns 1-3 we present the result
for the full sample, omitting the control for stock return volatility. In the
OLS regression the interaction between Largest shareholder and the Non-
Diversied dummy is insignicant while Largest shareholder is positive and
signicant, as in in our benchmark results of Table 3. In the Fixed Eect
and Random Eect results the opposite is true. We interpret this is some
supporting evidence that controlling shareholder risk aversion may account
for the observed levels of cash holding. We estimate the same model in the
reduced sample in columns 4-6, and the model with a control for share return
volatility included in columns 7-9. The results are qualitatively the same.
So it appears there is some robust evidence in favour of the risk aversion
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hypothesis. However, we caution against pushing that interpretation too
far because in our case (as in almost all other applications) the data do
not allow us to observe the degree of diversication on the comprehensive
personal portfolios of shareholders. 16
6.2 Is there a tax based explanation for cash holdings
in Belgian rms?
Foley, Hartzell, Titman & Twite (2007) show that tax reasons play a promi-
nent role in holding cash by multinational US rms and their aliates. More
specically, they show that aliates in countries with low tax rates hold more
cash than other aliates of the same rm.
We investigate tax motives in holding cash by looking at rms related
to coordination centers.17 Coordination centers were created in Belgium in
1982, in order to give incentives, mainly very attractive tax incentives, to
multinational groups to relocate their nancial operations in Belgium and to
favor employment. Coordination centers allow multinational groups to carry
out a large variety of nancial and managerial services on a roughly tax-free
basis. To investigate the eect of coordination centers on cash holdings we
introduce an interaction variable between a dummy variable, Coordination
Center, which takes on a value of one if the rm is associated with a coordi-
nation center and zero otherwise and Largest shareholder. We rerun the full
16We have also included the growth rate of total assets of rms as a further control
on the realized risk taking by rms. The growth term is insignicant and the qualitative
results are the same as in Table 6.
17Since 2008 these centers are ocially prohibited by law (some continue until 31 De-
cember 2010 under certain conditions), but they were in eect during our sample period
and they played an active role.
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model. The results are in Table 7 Columns (2). The interacted variable Co-
ordination Center* Largest shareholder it is not statistically signicant in the
xed eects model. From these results we cannot conclude that coordination
centers have an impact on cash holdings.
6.3 The second largest shareholder block
In principle, the eective control of a large shareholder may be diminished
by the presence of other large shareholders. To explore this, we calculate the
share holding of a second large shareholder. If the second shareholder has
any impact, we expect either a negative relationship between cash holdings
and share holding of the second shareholder or a smaller coecient on the
variable relative to the rst largest one. However, as has been argued by
Zwiebel (1995) it may be that large investors \create their own space," i.e.,
by holding large blocks they deter other block investors from locating in the
same rm. It appears that something like this operates in Belgium. In our
sample rms' ownership is highly concentrated, and in almost all cases where
there is a second largest declared shareholder she/he is very small.
Out of 1648 observations (from 1991 to 2006) almost half of the observa-
tions (807) have no declared second shareholder. When there exists a second
shareholder in the rm its share ownership is very small compared to the
rst one as we can observe from Table 1. On average a second shareholder
holds about 5% of equities while the leading one has 54%.
The variable Second shareholder is calculated as the size of the second
largest reported block of shares, taking into account institutional ownership
and voting alliances. The results of the full model augmented by this vari-
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able are reported in Columns (5), of Table 7. The estimated coecient is
never signicant. Thus there is no evidence of any eect of the presence of
a second block. The coecient estimates of other variables in the model are
not aected by the inclusion of Second shareholder. We also tried a speci-
cation where we use a dummy variable for the second shareholder instead of
percentage of shares. The results are not signicant.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the case of a strongly control-oriented nancial sys-
tem to see what eect the share ownership and governance structures have
on rms' decisions to hold liquid assets. We nd evidence of a positive asso-
ciation between ownership concentration and the level of liquid asset holding.
In addition we nd that rms' market valuation is positively associated with
cash held by rms. These results are evidence that liquid asset holding is
inuenced by a precautionary motive on the part of the controlling share-
holders. This may be due to a high control premium which makes outside
equity issuance very costly for insiders. And this may be reinforced by insid-
ers' risk aversion if they are unable to diversify their personal wealth while
maintaining control of the rm.
Previous observations of relatively high cash holdings in the face of poor
investor protections have generally been viewed as evidence of managerial
rent extraction (for instance, Dittmar et al. 2003, Pinkowitz et al. 2006,
Kalcheva & Lins 2007). Our analysis raises signicant doubts about this
interpretation in the context of a control-oriented nancial system such as
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the Belgian system we study. Indeed, our results indicate that in spite of
relatively weak investor protections, there exist large shareholders who have
the ability and the incentives to control manager (see eg., La Porta et al. 1998,
Shleifer & Vishny 1986, Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Signicant shareholding by
managers is the exception rather than the rule. When there are managers
with signicant stakes in the rm, we nd this has no eect on cash holding.
Hence our results conrm our hypothesis that in a corporate system like in
Belgium managers are monitored by large controlling shareholders and as
such there is no association between managerial ownership and the amount
of cash held by the rm. There is no evidence that high liquid asset holding
are due to independent managers keeping assets in liquid form that allows
them to extract rents.
We do nd evidence that liquid asset holding motivated by a precaution-
ary motive is mitigated somewhat by the operation of an internal capital
market as manifested most notably by cross share holdings among a group
of rms.
We further investigate the eect for rms of being related to coordination
centers on cash holdings. Firms are linked to these centers mainly for taxes
reasons. However, our results indicate no signicant eect on holding of
liquid assets. There is also no signicant eect of a second shareholder on
the cash held by rms.
While the ownership structures found in the Belgian case that we have
studied in detail contrast strongly with those found in the largest US and
UK rms, many of these features are present in other countries of continental
Europe and elsewhere. Our results suggest that eective control is often
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obtained through high ownership concentration. This suces to constrain
managers, but its by-product is a relatively high precautionary motive to
hold cash because insiders assign a high control premium to equity or risk
aversion or both.
27
References
(n.d.).
Anderson, W., R. & Carverhill, A. (2012), `Corporate liquidity and capital
structure', Review of Financial Studies 25, 797{837.
Bach, L. (2009), `Why are family rms so small? Theory and evidence from
France', Working Paper, Paris School of Economics .
Becht, M. & Mayer, C. (2001), The control of corporate Europe, ECGN,
Oxford University Press, chapter Introduction, pp. 1{45.
Becht, M. & Roell, A. (1999), `Blockholdings in Europe: An international
comparison', European Economic Review 43(4-6), 1049{1056.
Berle, A. A. & Means, G. C. (1932), The modern corporation and private
property, Macmillan, New York.
Cohen, A. (2006), `Going Dutch has new meaning in corporate takeover
battles', The Wall Street Journal .
Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J. & Servaes, H. (2003), `International corpo-
rate governance and corporate cash holdings', Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 38(1), 111{133.
Faccio, M. & Lang, L. (2002), `The ultimate ownership of Western European
corporations', Journal of Financial Economics 65(3), 365{395.
28
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T. & Mura, R. (2011), `Large shareholder diver-
sication and corporate risk-taking', The Review of Financial Studies
24(11), 3601{3641.
Foley, C., F., Hartzell, C., J., Titman, S. & Twite, G. (2007), `Why do rms
hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation', Journal of Financial
Economics 86, 579{607.
Franks, J., Mayer, C., Volpin, P. & Wagner, F., H. (2012), `The life cycle of
family ownership: International evidence', Review of Financial Studies
25(6), 1675{1712.
Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L. (2001), Corporate governance and economic
performance, Oxford University Press, chapter Country report: Corpo-
rate governance and economic performance - Belgium, pp. 85{95.
Harford, J., Mansi, A., S. & Maxwell, F., W. (2008), `Corporate governance
and rm cash holdings in the US', Journal of Financial Economics
87, 535{555.
Holmen, M., Knopf, J. D. & Peterson, S. (2007), `Trading-o corporate con-
trol and personal diversication through capital structure and merger
activity', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 34(9), 1470{1495.
Iskander-Datta, E, M. & Jia, Y. (2012), `Cross-country analysis of secular
cash trends', Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 898{912.
Jensen, M. C. (1986), `Agency costs of free cash ow, corporate nance and
takeovers', American Economic Review 76(2), 323{339.
29
Kalcheva, I. & Lins, K. V. (2007), `International evidence on cash holdings
and expected managerial agency problems', Review of Financial Studies
20(4), 1087{1112.
Kim, C.-S., Mauer, D. C. & Sherman, A. E. (1998), `The determinants of
corporate liquidity: Theory and evidence', Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 33, 305{334.
Kimball, Miles, S. (1992), New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance,
London: MacMillan Press, chapter Precautionary motives for holding
assets.
Kusnadi, Y. & Wei, John, K. (2011), `The determinants of corporate cash
management policies: Evidence from around the world', Journal of Cor-
porate Finance 17, 725{740.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1998), `Law
and nance', Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113{1155.
Liu, Y., Mauer, D. & Zhang, Y. (2014), `Firm cash holdings and CEO inside
debt', Journal of Banking and Finance 42, 83{100.
Mueller, E. (2008), `How does owners' exposure to idiosyncratic risk inu-
ence the capital structure of private companies?', Journal of Empirical
Finance 15, 185{198.
Myers, S. C. & Rajan, R. (1998), `The paradox of liquidity', Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 5, 733{771.
30
Nikolov, B. & Whited, T. M. (2014), `Agency conicts and cash: Estimates
from a dynamic model', Journal of Finance 69(5), 1883{1921.
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. & Williamson, R. (1999), `The determi-
nants and implications of corporate cash holdings', Journal of Financial
Economics 52, 3{46.
Ozkan, A. & Ozkan, N. (2004), `Corporate cash holdings: An empirical inves-
tigation of UK companies', Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2103{
2134.
Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. & Williamson, R. (2006), `Does the contribution of
corporate cash holdings and dividends to rm value depend on gover-
nance? A cross-country analysis', Journal of Finance 61(6), 2725{2751.
Raice, S. & Patrick, M. (2015), `The rise of the `Stichting', an obscure
takeover defense', The Wall Street Journal .
Rajan, R. & Zingales, L. (1995), `What do we know about capital structure?
Some evidence from international data', Journal of Finance 50, 1421{
1460.
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1986), `Large shareholders and corporate con-
trol', Journal of Political Economy 95, 461{488.
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997), `A survey of corporate governance',
Journal of Finance 52(2), 737{783.
31
Sraer, D. & Thesmar, D. (2007), `Performance and behavior of family rms:
Evidence from the French stock market', Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 5(4), 09{751.
Vandendooren, S. (2012), `Les trois frere Moortgat: Les ma^tres de la Duvel',
Trends-Tendances .
Verduyn, L. (2013), Les 200 familles les plus riches de Belgique, Editions
Jourdan.
Zwiebel, J. (1995), `Block investment and partial benets of corporate con-
trol', Review of Economic Studies 62, 161{185.
32
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3
Liquid assets 1648 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.13
Largest shareholder 1648 0.54 0.40 0.54 0.70
Manager's shares 1648 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Second shareholder 1648 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.08
Age (in years) 1648 55 23 64 79
Size 1648 18.78 17.47 18.51 20.08
Leverage 1648 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.55
Financial xed assets 1648 0.49 0.22 0.52 0.73
Capital expenditure 1648 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
Working capital 1648 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.25
Cash ow 1648 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.08
R&D expenditure 1648 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Market-to-book value 1648 1.17 0.54 0.90 1.44
Firm risk 1078 0.03 0.017 0.02 0.03
Total assets growth 959 0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.14
Liquid assets is cash in hand and at bank, and marketable securities divided
by total assets. Largest shareholder variable is the percentage of the share-
holdings of the largest shareholder in the rm either he is an individual or a
voting coalition. Manager's shares is the percentage of the reported share-
holdings of a company's managers regardless of his rank in the board. Second
shareholder is the percentage of the shareholdings of the second shareholder
in the rm. Age is the age of the rm in number of years. Size is measured by
the log of total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt,
divided by total assets. Financial xed assets is the ratio of shareholdings of
the rm in tied rms and rms with which there exists a participation link
divided by total assets. Capital expenditure are new acquisitions of tangible
assets, divided by total assets. Working capital is computed net of cash and
is divided by total assets. Cash ow is earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total assets. R&D expenditure are expenses in R&D, divided by
total assets. Market-to-book value is the market capitalisation of the rm
divided by total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of the stock
returns of rms. Total assets growth is growth rate of total assets.
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Table 7: The eect of coordination centers and the second shareholder on
cash holdings
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest shareholder 0.031** 0.032 0.046** 0.029** 0.051** 0.043**
(0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
Coordination Center*Largest Shareholder -0.013 0.038 -0.008
(0.011) (0.043) (0.026)
Second shareholder 0.005 0.020 -0.002
(0.040) (0.050) (0.046)
Age -0.001 0.022 -0.003 -0.001 0.021 -0.003
(0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007)
Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Total debt -0.089*** -0.025 -0.043*** -0.090*** -0.023 -0.043***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014)
Financial xed assets -0.293*** -0.246*** -0.264*** -0.296*** -0.246*** -0.264***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Capital expenditures -0.229*** -0.046 -0.072 -0.230*** -0.044 -0.073
(0.084) (0.048) (0.047) (0.084) (0.048) (0.047)
Working capital -0.208*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.209*** -0.251*** -0.251***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
Cash ow 0.037* 0.041*** 0.036** 0.037* 0.041*** 0.035**
(0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
R&D 0.352** -0.146 0.177 0.344** -0.134 0.175
(0.143) (0.429) (0.241) (0.144) (0.430) (0.241)
Constant 0.349*** 0.209** 0.329*** 0.365*** 0.212** 0.334***
(0.048) (0.085) (0.062) (0.042) (0.085) (0.061)
Observations 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648
R2 0.335 0.158 0.335 0.157
Hausman test 0.0000 0.0000
This Table presents the estimations of the eects of coordination centers in Columns (1) to (3) and the second shareholder
in Columns (4) to (9) on cash holdings. Largest shareholder is the percentage of shareholding of the largest controlling
shareholder in the rm. Coordination center is a dummy variable taking into account the fact that a rm is related to
these centers or not. Second shareholder is the percentage of shareholding of the second shareholder in the rm. Age is
rm age expressed in log. Size is measured by the log of total assets. Total debt is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt, divided by total assets. Financial xed assets is the ratio of shareholdings of the rm in tied rms and rms with
which there exists a participation link divided by total assets. Capital expenditures are new acquisitions of tangible assets,
divided by total assets. Working capital is computed net of cash and is divided by total assets. Cash ow is earnings
before interest and taxes divided by total assets. R&D are expenses in R&D, divided by total assets. Robust standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Largest controlling shareholders diversi-
cation
A.1 Data sources
We collect data on the composition of portfolios of the largest shareholders,
in our listed rms, from several sources depending on their type and nation-
ality18. Indeed, the largest shareholders can be Belgian or foreigner rms or
physical persons. When the largest shareholders are Belgian rms, we use
two data sources: For the period from 1991 to 1996 we use the depository
of the annual accounts of all Belgian rms at the National Bank of Belgium
database known as the \Centrale des Bilans". This database also contains
the participations/subsidiaries of rms in addition to their annual accounts.
Then for the period from 1997 to 2006 we use Belrst database from Bureau
Van Dijk which contains amongst other data the participations/subsidiaries
of Belgian rms.19 When the largest shareholders are European rms we use
Bureau Van Dijk's Amadeus database. It turns out that very few foreign
largest shareholders are present in Belgian rms. In fact, only 28 percent
of rm/year observations are foreign largest shareholders and 23 percent of
which are shareholders in the neighboring countries namely, The Nether-
lands, France, and Luxembourg. When the largest shareholders are physical
persons20, there is no systematic database to use. Yet, an advantage of study-
18If the largest shareholder is a voting block, which means that several shareholders are
together, to determine the level of diversication we investigate the portfolio composition
of the largest shareholder in the voting block.
19Data from Bureau Van Dijk starts in 1997.
20More than 9 percent of rm/year observations in our sample.
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ing Belgian listed rms, in this regards, is the existence of several sources we
could rely on to establish the main source (s) of wealth of families/individuals
who are the owners of Belgian listed rms. One of these sources is the work
of the Belgian journalist Verduyn (2013). He presents the wealthiest Belgian
families in the format of a hit-parade based on their estimated wealth. The
book is full of information about dierent aspects of Belgian corporate sys-
tem. It provides the history of families, which generation of the family is
in charge, the dierent relations between the dierent families through mar-
riages and alliances, how the business evolved and developed, the various
changes the rm went through like mergers, liquidations, listing, delisting
from the stock market, in addition to many other informative stories and
anecdotes. The estimation of families' or individuals' wealth presented is
based on the professional wealth meaning that all the family belongings in
terms of businesses.21 Another rich source on families' wealth and businesses
are the Belgian nancial press such as the magazine Trends-Tendances where
many details about Belgian families, their wealth, their rms, their invest-
ments, etc, are discussed weekly. Hence, to establish whether the families and
their members are diversied or not we also consulted press articles mainly
from the online archives of Trends-Tendances magazine.22 In 2007 Trends-
Tendances published a hit-parade of the 100 wealthiest Belgian families in
the fashion of Forbes Magazine. This classication showed that the estima-
tions made by Ludwig Verduyn or by Trends-Tendances are accurate. Indeed,
Forbes Magazine in its hit-parade of the wealthiest personalities in the world
21This journalist also has the website derijkstebelgen.be which reports news and updates
on the evolution of families' businesses and wealth.
22These online archives go back in time to the nineties.
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included Albert Frere and his estimated wealth which was similar to the
earlier estimations provided by Ludwig Verduyn and by Trends-Tendances.
These data sources are very rich and we are condent that they are accurate.
Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that it is likely that not every single
item of the wealth of these families or individuals is included in these estima-
tions. They might, for instance, also own expensive real estate, luxury cars,
art, etc., but this will remain by no means comparable to the wealth they
invest in their rms.
A.2 The procedure to establish whether the largest
shareholder is diversied or not
Before establishing the level of diversication of shareholders we need to rst
identify them with the objective of nding for each its unique national iden-
tier. This requires nding their exact names, their types whether they are
physical persons or rms, their countries, etc. The unique national identier
confusion when rms have similar names. Therefore, we undertake a care-
ful examination of the largest shareholders of our listed rms. Sources we
use for this are Bureau Van Dijk databases - Belrst for Belgian rms and
Amadeus for the other European ones. We also use annual reports of listed
rms where the shareholders of listed rms are reported with some details
such as their addresses which allow us to narrow down the search to one spe-
cic country. An additional source we use is the declarations of control to the
Banking Commission which in many instances contain further details about
the shareholders which help in identifying them. When these sources are ex-
hausted without nding the required information we resort to the internet.
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As a next step we search for the portfolio composition of those shareholders
with a unique identier. With this procedure the only reliable information we
could extract is each shareholder's number of participations/subsidiaries.23
Some European shareholders were not present in the dierent databases but
for which we could ascertain whether they are diversied or not. For instance,
shareholders who are incorporated in The Netherlands under the legal form
of foundations (Stichting AdministratieKantoor in Dutch) are entities usually
established by families to represent their share ownership and most impor-
tantly they are also used as an anti-takeover device working as poison pills.24
Our checks show that the managers of these structures are family members.
Similar structures whose purpose is control exist in other countries, like in
Luxembourg. Hence, with the information gathered about the number of par-
ticipations/subsidiaries and whether a shareholder has participations in other
rms or not (without being able to get the exact number of subsidiaries) we
are able to construct a dummy variable for under-diversication. This vari-
able equals one if the only investment of the shareholder is the listed rm
(under-diversied) and zero if her portfolio is composed of more rms (di-
versied). Our denition of diversication is similar to that of Faccio et al.
(2011). They use the log of the number of rms composing the portfolio
of a shareholder as a measure of diversication, we instead use a dummy
23We were not able with reasonable eorts to nd the identiers of all subsidiaries of all
shareholders and search for their accounting data to get the amount of wealth invested by
the shareholder in each one of them. Note that these subsidiaries dier in terms of legal
type, size, location, etc., which makes it very dicult to gather information for all or even
a majority of them.
24These foundations were under the spotlights recently because of their role in impeding
hostile take-overs. See for instance, articles in The Wall Street Journal by Cohen (2006)
and Raice & Patrick (2015).
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based on the number of investments in the portfolio of shareholders. The
assumption underlying the use of the number of participations as a proxy
for diversication is that the larger the number of rms an investor has in
its portfolio the more likely she is diversied (Faccio et al. 2011). The lim-
itation with such a measure is that it does not account for the weights of
each investment in the portfolio and may overstate (understate) the level
of diversication (non-diversication). Nevertheless, its advantage is that
it allows measuring \portfolio diversication without requiring any further
information about the portfolio (such as the portfolio structure or returns
distribution)" (Faccio et al. (2011), page 3608).
B Family-rm data
Any analysis of rm behavior which distinguishes family-rms from non-
family-rms will be sensitive to precisely how rms are classied into these
groupings. One of the most ambitious attempts in this direction is the study
of the ownership of listed Western European corporations by Faccio & Lang
(2002) (F&L, henceforth). According to their methodology, a rm is con-
sidered a family-rm if the controlling shareholder is identied as a family
(including an individual) or if it is an unlisted company. Recently Franks
et al. (2012) have undertaken a more detailed analysis of the largest rms,
both listed and private, in each of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Unlike
F&L, their data allows them to trace the ultimate ownership of private as
well as listed companies through ownership chains involving both listed and
private companies. When they compare their data with the F&L data for
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their four countries they nd that out of the 1359 companies identied by
F&L as family owned 532 (or 39%) are not family-rms by the Franks et al.
(2012) methodology. In 380 (or 28%) of the cases there is an unambiguous
misclassication, generally as a result of F&L's assumption that control by
a private rm implies family ownership. In the remaining 11% of cases there
is an ambiguous listing status or there is no information available to assign
ultimate ownership.
Many studies interested in investigating dierent aspects of family-rms
use F&L data. For instance, Kalcheva & Lins (2007) use F&L data to study
the managerial agency problem related to cash holdings for a cross-country
sample including Belgium which is the country of our current investigation.25
The Kalcheva & Lins (2007) measure of insider control is dened as the
\control rights held by the management group and its family." Thus, if F&L
classify the rm as family controlled then Kalcheva & Lins (2007) assign
the associated shares as being held by management. This might result in a
misclassication for two reasons. Either it may be that the controlling block
is held by a private company which is not controlled by a family. Or even if
the controlling block is family controlled, it may be that no family member
is involved in the management of the rm.
Our sample is drawn from Belgian listed rms which presents an inter-
esting case in this context because under the law on shareholding disclosure
introduced in 1989, shareholders are required to declare whether they are
part of a voting alliance which could be a family group. Furthermore, many
Belgian rms are very old by international standards with origins that can
25Kalcheva & Lins (2007) cross-country sample also includes countries for which Franks
et al. (2012) report family-rm misclassications by F&L.
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be traced to the 19th century. The matters of family succession and wealth
of Belgian dynasties are widely followed and commented upon in the Belgian
press. As a result, we can draw upon a variety of sources of supplementary
information when verifying the classication of rms into family-rms and
non-family-rms.
When we undertake the comparison of our data set with the classica-
tions of F&L, in line with Franks et al. (2012) we nd numerous cases of
misclassication by F&L. Specically, there are 8 cases of rms considered
family-rms by F&L because they nd the ultimate owner is a private com-
pany but where we nd no such link to a family group. In 5 of these cases, the
rms are state-owned. Furthermore, there are 7 rms that F&L consider not
family controlled where we are able to conrm that they are in fact family
controlled. In addition to all these inconsistencies, the year of data selection
is not 1999, as claimed in their paper, but a mix of years between 1996 and
1999.
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